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Limen, Portal, Network Subjectivities 
Sean Cubitt 
Parallax 
Extended Abstract: The ambiguity of the term 'network subjectivities' is enticing: is there a 
subjectivity proper to networks? Is that subjectivity itself distributed? The inference in each case is 
that there is or has been a subjectivity that is or was not networked in either sense. It follows then 
that there must be a passage between non- or pre-networked subjectivity and networked, a 
threshold. Anne Friedman's work would suggest that the key threshold is the human-computer 
interface, the physical display and the software interface that appears in it. Her analysis concerns 
the actual, but subjectivity also concerns the potential. To pursue that we need to look at imaginary 
(fictitious, experimental) accounts of thresholds between worlds. This paper looks at liminal spaces 
and portals in popular culture as evidence for the potential of subjectivities in transition between 
IRL or individualist subjectivity towards networks and networking. From Odysseus' visit to the 
gates of the underworld and Orpheus' rescue of Eurydice, all the way to Malevich's black icon, the 
liminal has been approached with ritual and trepidation. Transitions between worlds retain their 
magic in the Narnia books of C.S. Lewis and the tesseract of Interstellar, but lose their ritual and 
their power to demand awe and fear in the promise of easy, cost-free travel between the mundane 
world and any one of thousands of networked worlds.  
 
Such transitions, we know from our GPS trackers, do not involve a change of place; therefore they 
must involve a change of state, whose essence will be temporal rather than spatial, and thus also 
historical. The major historical change of the period covering the rise of network communications 
has been the rise of dataveillance, and its corollary, the real subsumption of consumption under 
capital. With the approaching exhaustion or higher risks associated with the extraction of natural 
resources, capital turns to the exploitation of human nature, notably through mapping behaviours as 
predictors of future activity, exploiting the creativity of interactors as unpaid sources of innovation, 
and personal debt. The derivatives market in debt producers the singular temporality of 
contemporary network capital and its subjectivity. 
 
This paper follows the histories that have produced this condition, including those of individuation, 
the construction of states of affairs as data, and the variety of terms frequently used as binary 
opposites of truth, each constitutive of a different kind of subject. This analysis prompts a definition 
of ideology as the intersection of the wishful and the paranoid, a position characterisable as 
subjunctive that should be taken as the typical form of network subjectivity as liminal. This in turn 
suggests two further hypotheses, that the category and the reality of the human has become 
environmental, that is treated as economic externality and as divorced from the core of the social; 
and that this alienated, subjunctive, mass subject is now in process of dissolving its links with the 
subjectivity as sovereignty, to replace it with the grounds for a new sociality. The challenge of the 
present conjuncture is therefore to construct a new 'we' capable of expressing the newly 
interdependent networks, not only of communications, but of ecological and technological 
imbrication of humans and non-humans, in a new politics. 
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Cinema Effect, Ecomedia, The Practice of Light: Genealogies of Visual Media and Finite Media: 
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Limen, Portal, Network Subjectivities 
 
The thresholds between worlds are by nature sacred. Passage between the worlds of the living 
and the dead is strange and holy. For the ancients, and for the religions of the book, precise 
places of transition to another world are scenes of veneration. Messenger angels may pass 
when and where they desire, but precise places and times (solstice or Walpurgisnacht) mark 
the portal that allows traffic between human and other universes. Early examples of portable 
portals, oil paintings liberated visions of heaven and hell from their anchorage on church 
walls. In 1913, Kasimir Malevich, attempting an equally ambitious route to the other side of 
mind, made his emblematic portal out of a black square: ‘Even I was gripped by a kind of 
timidity bordering on fear when it came to leaving "the world of will and idea," in which I had 
lived and worked and in the reality of which I had believed’. (Malevich 2012: 118). Film too 
made the blank rectangle of the screen a passageway to other worlds. In the 21st century, the 
screen is no longer replicated in dedicated theatres but multiplied towards ubiquity. One 
hundred years after Malevich, Christopher Nolan's Interstellar (2014) has its characters travel 
through two portals: a wormhole in space, and a 4-dimensional tesseract in time, the 
geometric equivalent, of Malevich's 2-dimensional square. In Interstellar and a number of 
other 'irreality' films, in mutated accordance with Malevich's desert 'where nothing is real 
except feeling'(Malevich 2012: 118), undying love for a wife or child is the clew that retains 
for a suddenly granular and vertiginously fluid world a final rationale. The differences 
between 1913 and 2014 suggest that we may seek out a history of subjectivity through a 
history of imaginary media from Malevich to Nolan: a history that takes us from modernism's 
alternate history of mystical engagements to the mysterium of the digital. 
 
Jeffrey Sconce (2000) suggests that spirits learned the art of table-tapping only after the 
adoption of Morse code telegraphy.  In alliance with the phonograph, telegraphy ensured that 
they could communicate in any living room or hall. As the phonograph allowed the voices of 
the dead to persist beyond their time, telegraphy and later radio ensured that they were no 
longer bound in space. Even so, Verne's Voyage to the Centre of the Earth (and its 1968 film 
adaptation) and the novels of the great mediaevalist CS Lewis (and their 21st century film 
adaptations) still preserved the ancient faith in the passageway anchored in place. The 
portable gateway only really became a possibility with the advent of telecommunications, and 
really takes off in the era of mass computing. This may help explain why William Gibson's 
cyberspace is introduced in the opening line of Neuromancer (1984) as the colour of 
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'television tuned to a dead channel' – television, the ground metaphor for electronic 
communication, tuned to the channel of the dead. The continuity between the oldest of 
narratives, the Epic of Gilgamesh, and the most recent of science fiction (the haunting and 
portals of Corey's Expanse novels starting with Leviathan Wakes [2011] and their current TV 
adaptation), is undone by the end of place as the absolute of transport between worlds. 
Displacement of the portal, its divorce from the tightly specified locations of myth, accelerates 
and intensifies between telegraph and smartphone, leaving even the domestic hearth with its 
memories of lares et penates behind. 
* 
Networks are other worlds. Like the posthumous world of the ancestors, networks permeate 
our world. Though Christianity taught that death is the 'bourne from which no traveller 
returns', it never wholly abandoned the resurrection of the body or the intercession of the 
saints. The dead have always been able to visit the land of the living. The reverse journey has 
always been more difficult: only the dying pass that way. Network subjectivity, like Lewis's 
Wood Between The Worlds, allows us to pass easily from this world to others that shadow it. 
No dangerous voyage, no blood sacrifice, no dying. The threshold is everywhere and nowhere. 
It is easy to forget which side of it we are on. We – by which I mean those of us who pass 
between a physically networked existence and an ostensibly dematerialised existence online 
– no longer know who is haunting whom. We pass between various networks – televisual, 
professional, sporting, gaming – in both physical and online modes. If we live in a thoroughly 
networked condition, we also live with a condition of permanent passage through portals 
from one network to the next. A cellular network call taken on the network rail service via 
wifi network services is no longer strange, or sacred. The challenge only becomes the greater 
when we try to answer Escobar's challenge, drawn from his work with indigenous networks 
of the Columbian Pacific: 'Is it possible to differentiate between dominant and oppositional 
networks, for example? Or are they all so inextricably tied that even an analytical separation 
of them becomes useless?' (Escobar 2008: 11). Network topologies make it hard to identify 
'sides' in any of the word's many senses; the changing condition of the portal into networks, 
increasingly a node where networks meet, shares that topological and categorial 
embarrassment. 
 
Malevich seems not to have been embarrassed that in his pursuit of the non-objective, his 
black square was itself an object, an analogon (Sartre 2004: 57-94). Its function was to 
negate, but it was not itself non-existent. In this sense it truly functioned as an icon: as the 
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visible presence of an immaterial, invisible otherness. The condition is more complex with 
Interstellar, where the wormhole is simultaneously 'here' (with spatial coordinates near 
Saturn) and elsewhere but does not itself exist except as a negation of place. This condition is, 
like the icon, emblematic of a new constellation of subjectivity at a threshold. Not only is the 
limen no longer anchored in place, geographical or legal; it is no longer a firmly inscribed 
border marking off the distinction between this side and that. Such borders are no longer 
simply porous but exceed and confound any cartography of cis and trans, as the Alps that 
once defined a major military and administrative boundary between Cis-Alpine and Trans-
Alpine were not only turned into a thoroughfare by Hannibal but constitute in themselves a 
timeless persistence between hither and yon. Though we still fear dying, our secular culture 
fears it not as the transition to a new condition, that of death, but as a terrain between life and 
nothingness. We no longer respect it as religious or mythic thought did: as a transition whose 
core characteristic was to alter fundamentally but not to terminate the relation that marks us 
as living: communication. Now communicative networks are invisible and omnipresent, we 
experience transition between modes of being as banal. They signal almost nothing more 
ritual than a slight change of behaviour, and it is hard to say whether the transition triggers 
the ritual performance of the suitable role, or adopting the role triggers the transition. The 
first challenge therefore of network subjectivities is the conceptualisation of networks.   
 
We may not be able to supply spatial coordinates but, if networking implies a change of state 
then, unlike Malevich's escape from the objective, it implies a subjectivity tied to the time of 
change. When is network subjectivity? If its spatial coordinates are no longer critical to the 
ritual of transition, and allowing for the abandonment of any semantically significant calendar 
(now entirely defined by arithmetically interchangeable units of time), yet still convinced 
phenomenologically that the moment or instant of transition matters and signifies, then when 
does it occur? When is the 'now' of transition between worlds, which today means of 
transition between networks? 
 
Reflecting on the postmodern turn against structuralism and functionalism in the 1970s and 
1980s, Moishe Postone argued at the brink of the new century that 
The challenge for theory today is to adequately grasp contemporary 
historical dynamics in a way that avoids the unhappy choice between 
adopting a reified conception of structural dynamics that leaves no 
room for agency, or attempting to preserve agency by denying the very 
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existence of such dynamics (Postone 1999: 5). 
If the question of network subjectivity is temporal, then it is also historical, concerning the 
history of both networks and subjectivity. Postone's eve-of-millennium paper analyses two 
influential texts by Daniel Bell (1973) and Ernest Mandel (1972), published at the moment of 
the 1973 “oil crisis” today largely counted as the event that ushered in the period – in which 
we now live – of neoliberalism, globalisation and financialisation. Bell, radically over-
simplifying Postone's subtle reading, was ultimately a technological determinist, while 
Mandel, arguing that ‘late capitalism thus constitutes generalized universal industrialization 
for the first time in history (Mandel 1972: 387), asserted financialisation and the increasingly 
intrusive capitalisation, commodification and industrialisation of more and more domains of 
life. Like Postone, a more recent attempt at periodisation argues that both approaches have to 
be assimilated if we are to get a handle on the contemporary. Jason W Moore (2015) argues 
that science and the state are key instruments in the permeation of capital. Moore's central 
task is to include nature, not as external victim, but as integral factor in the history of capital 
accumulation (a theme in Marxism since Rosa Luxemburg [1951]) and its dependence on 
unpaid work and energy. 
 
The integration of more and more aspects of human activity into capital depends on keeping 
various 'natural' free sources of work and energy outside the commodity relation and wage 
labour for as long as possible. This is as true, Moore argues, of women's work as it is of 
'natural' resources. But at certain critical points, the extraction of that work begins to require 
capitalisation: a clear example is that once a forest has been felled, the land farmed, and the 
soil exhausted, continued exploitation demands capitalisation in the form of machinery and 
fertilisers. In our time, the commodification of child-care and cookery corresponds to a 
transition from unpaid domestic labour to women's entry into the labour force. Nature is 
definable as what was available for free: timber, soil, reproduction. As reserves are exhausted, 
capital must either capitalise these resources, or find new ones – the fantasy that powers 
exodus from an exhausted Earth in Interstellar. As geographical frontiers become fewer and 
more extreme (polar oil extraction for example), the turn is towards another form of nature: 
human nature, and in particular –here my argument extends and departs from Moore's – 
human creativity. Contemporary capital is marked as a historical period by its expropriation, 
unpaid, of human creativity in the form of network subjectivity. The first form this takes is 
that of derivatives in the finance market, exploiting data about present and future buying and 
selling as a source of wealth. The second exploits the inventiveness of social media, online 
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gaming, video sharing, microblogging and all the other unpaid creations of online work. 
 
This new mode of accumulation by dispossession (Harvey 2004) is premised on massive 
quantities of data, but also on its exceptionally granular form. The mass of online data is 
comprised not of subjects (individuals) but of behaviours. The individual subject is no longer 
of interest to advanced capital, save as an aggregate of behaviours. The attack on Cartesian 
subjectivity so central to 1970s post-structuralists thus arrives at its ironic destination: but 
the self has not been dissolved but distributed. In the first instance, the entire value of this 
distributed subjectivity rests on its real-time activities. Capital chases the new, both in order 
to commodify it, and because it is only in the present that labour acts, not only producing its 
end-products but also the labour-value from which capital extracts its profit. At the same 
time, the accumulation of data from the past becomes tradable in the present because it is 
held to predict the future. Nolan's Interstellar tesseract, that allows direct mining of the past 
and future in an eternal present for which time is unpaid raw material, is not a fantastical 
economy but expresses a historic present no longer capable of production, only of 
expropriation. This accumulation is only of value in relation to living behaviours, in the same 
way that the 'dead labour' of machinery is only valuable when employed by living labour. 
Thus online behaviours are productive once in the living present and instantly in their 
accumulation as a reserve, knowledge of which is a proprietary good monopolised by the 
platform enterprises that exploit it. This unpaid and to that extent uncommodified work thus 
operates simultaneously as living and fixed capital, as real-time action and as accumulation of 
the past in the form of property. 
 
What is shocking in this is the absence of potential: of the capacity of work and creativity 
specifically, to produce the future, definable as the unforeseen. As the second mode of 
network subjectivity, financialisation, ties behaviours to the market in debt. Debt is accrued 
by borrowing from the future. As consumer discipline, debt locks the debtor into perpetual 
labour, in order to earn the wages she has already spent in the present. Debt depends on 
spending future earnings in the present, foreshortening the possibility of any future 
whatsoever (the same principle that governs ecological exhaustion: the environmental is for 
capital always future, so has no place in present accounts, and therefore has no existence). 
The temporality of subjectivity clarifies the nature of contemporary networks, simultaneously 
technological, economic and political, so that we can understand what they may signify 
culturally – and what cultural interventions might be able to undertake in this nexus. 
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The argument is that the mass psyche created and stored in network databases and 
architectures (which are themselves repositories of behaviours) is the critical mass for 
exploitable creativity, required because other forms of creative labour (athletes, cultural 
performers, celebrity engineers) have become prohibitively expensive. Unlike artisan 
production, mass production of cultural innovation no longer requires research and 
development laboratories, partly because universities can be forced by policy levers to 
perform the same tasks far more cheaply, and partly because mass consumption has become 
mass presumption. In both instances, interacting with online environments has become 
exploitable and unpaid work. The portal to the latest great reserve of unexploited labour is 
human data productivity. The tragedy is that this was itself the vision of some of the greatest 
prophets of technological liberation, like them Teilhard de Chardin's noosphere (1961: 278). 
What should have been the greatest outcome of capital's communications revolutions, the 
global village (McLuhan and Powers 1989), has instead become the biopolitical equivalent of 
an oilfield, a vat of undifferentiable behaviours. 
 
The 1973 oil crisis was resolved by creating new instruments for debt, which in turn created 
the 2007/8 debt crisis. The debt crisis, which has outlived the 'critical' term by a decade at 
time of writing, seeks a new resolution in the form of information. There are no more 
environmental freebies, and the expedient of spending future money is, if not foreclosed, 
increasingly expensive, like all resources near the end of the period of savage dispossession. 
In its place is a modification of the consumerism fostered by Keynesianism as the resolution 
of the 1929 crisis. The new form of the consumer is the prosumer, as critical today as the 
emergence of the disciplined consumer of Fordist production was in the rescue of capital 
from the Wall Street Crash. Not just completing choices but generating new commercialisable 
forms, free creative labour – in the form of behaviours – is the new resource frontier. As the 
human biomass has as its last biopolitical function to supply globalisable information on its 
genetics to fuel the freeloading pharmaceutical and genomics industries, so creativity is a 
massive generator of information, which by definition must include a healthy dose of the 
unexpected, which an increasingly universalised and normalised commodification militates 
against. The work and energy that Moore emphasises is now supplemented by information. 
The environment, whose resources can no longer be seized without capital- and labour-
intensive operating costs, becomes, in Jennifer Gabrys' (2016) term, programmable. 
Information is the latest and perhaps the last get-out-of-jail-free card. However, mining 
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everything for its data belongs to the monopoly tendency of capital accumulation. Capital 
intends to resolve the 2007 debt crisis through primitive accumulation of information capital, 
but here is no reason to believe that information is an infinite resource. But the information 
that is being turned into commodities includes information which is not even in development 
but merely conceptual possibility, the case with pre-emptive patents (for example on 
molecules that have not yet been synthesised and whose possible applications are unknown). 
The self-destructive logic of information capital is visible in its commitment to investing in 
fantasies. 
 
The form under which information is accumulated and exploited is data. Data are not 
qualities of the worlds but statements about it. Their value to capital is not based on their 
accuracy but on their form. Human behaviour seen phenomenologically or anthropologically 
is constituted by relationships between actors and between actors and their worlds. Data 
abstracts from these mediations only points of action which can be described in unit form: a 
gesture such as a swipe on a dating app; a calculation such as a bid on an auction site; an 
imagined action such as might be included in a posting to a story-telling forum. Its only 
determination is that the unit of data is well-formed, that it can be isolated, accumulated and 
counted. However, from the point of view of the subjects engaged in these behaviours, they 
can be categorised according to their kind. Certain data propose themselves as truths. In the 
permanent state of argument established by internet culture's filter bubbles and echo 
chambers, the defining quality of these truths is that they are not lies, which are the data of 
opposing factions in politics or any other field of combat. Other data either propose 
themselves as fictions or are ascribed fictional status, while others still are clearly fantasies. 
One way of establishing the relation between these terms is the Greimas semiotic square. 
 
[FIG 1: truths0.png] 
 
Truth defines itself in opposition to various modes of untruth. If it is to pass, a lie must have 
the same formal properties as a statement of truth. In this instance the criterion of truth is not 
its reference to an indisputable state of affairs beyond the statement itself: for present 
purposes truth is the quality of a statement that allows it to be considered true in the 
discourse it forms part of. Similarly, lies are discursive forms. They have the same shape as a 
true statement. The difference is that the speaker does not believe the statement (and 
therefore opens the possibility for the hearer to disbelieve). Lies are distinguished from 
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fictions, which are also disbelieved, because fictions do not have the shape of discursive truth. 
Instead, in the same way that intellectual property law allows patents on concepts that are 
only developmental possibilities, they operate in the subjunctive mood, expressing a possible 
state of affairs that doesn't exist but is feasible or desirable. The same is true of fantasies, 
which similarly express non-existent states of affairs, with the distinguishing feature that they 
are believed, at least for the duration of the fantasy (a dream or a gambler's belief in his luck, 
for example). This gives us a neat set of categories to qualify relations between subjects and 
statements. 
 
[FIG 2: truths1.png] 
 
In the terrain in the centre of the square, the link between fantasy and lie is that of the self-
deluded: who either believe they have the right to lie, or actually believe the lie. The former 
might be the case of a narcissistic politician granted apparently unlimited power. The link 
between truth and fiction, on the other hand, is the liberal axis of faith in a future which 
however remains unrealised. This might be the case of an idealistic politician who recognises 
that his power to effect major change is impossible but nonetheless makes it his mission. If 
the fantasies-lies axis is pathological, it is in part because of its categorial confusion. The 
truths-fictions axis is utopian, in the liberal sense of the word. Between them these two axes 
describe, in part, the terrain between the cardinal points of the square as the field of ideology. 
 
By treating both humans and their environments equally as data sources, the network mode 
of production invokes a potentially utopian network subjectivity; but at the same time its 
dialectic is unevenly impacted by a pathological engagement in, for example, neo-populism, 
placing  the transitional moment of entry into network subjectivity firmly in the terrain of 
ideology, typically torn between the wishful and the paranoid. This is the terrain of high 
productivity mined by contemporary network capital. 
 
The risk is that human nature as resource may be as rapidly exhausted as previous free 
natures, potentially through processes of normalisation associated with the commodity cycle, 
effected through the increasing standardisation of algorithms and software, leading to lower 
productivity and higher unit costs to extract the same value in innovation, and/or lower 
quality innovations requiring more capitalisation to marketise. This risk is itself future, and to 
that extent risks becoming itself mere ideology. What must be marked however is that the 
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historical arrival of contemporary network subjectivity is not an act of production or even of 
exploitation but one of appropriation. The old human/natural divide casts only the palest 
shadow of its former clarity. The human has indeed become environmental. The commons of 
human nature, the wellsprings of shared creativity and cultural making, are in process of 
being enclosed. The result is no healthier than the late mediaeval enclosures and the early 
capitalist colonies before. 
 
The significance of the threshold in this nexus arises from the internal contradictions in the 
temporality and multiplicity of network subjectivity, which destabilises the four-square 
stability of the Greimas diagram by introducing time as an essential component (in this also 
having to confront the end of consciousness as the solid form of the 'I' which no longer 
provides a solution in the age of distributed behaviours). Sociologically, the subject-in-nature 
has been so profoundly alienated that it seeks an infinite freedom in the network, which is 
incapable of supplying it except as a multiplication of network 'worlds'. Only the experience 
of transition into a new world provides that instant of self-identity which however is betrayed 
by the quality of the transition: that it is an instant rather than a moment. Nonetheless the 
repetition provides the subject with a sense of its own dissatisfaction. This is no longer the 
incompletion of the subject outlined by Lacan and Deleuze. Rather it is the dissatisfaction of 
an already dissolved subjectivity that nonetheless finds itself neither reunited with its primal 
environment (womb, mother's arms, nature as all-embracing union of bodily and world) or 
permitted possession of its own behaviours, already algorithmically isolated from it as data. 
At the threshold of (another) network subjectivity arises the intuition that the lack is 
fundamentally social: not my possession of things, capacities or knowledge but my possession 
by them. This is the satisfaction that network capital cannot assuage and that therefore 
becomes a profound, existential demand of the distributed subject.  
 
Every point in a network is its centre. At present, the data-generating subject feels itself being 
exploited from all points of the compass, rather than nurtured and embraced. This is the 
source of the felt demand to perform accordingly: to play being entertaining, happy and 
successful online. Where today the pressure to inauthenticity generates on the one hand 
profit for online capital and mental illness for its proletariat, in a trajectory towards 
exhaustion, the same contradictions begin to indicate the contrary: the possibility of a post-
individualist dissolution in the noosphere. In itself this position risks the status of mere 
ideology, unless it is clear that what is at stake in network subjectivity is no longer the truth 
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or falsehood of the data subject, but instead the subjunctive mode of existence which the very 
move to information capital has made central to human experience. In place of being 
subjected to technology and alienated nature, including the alienation of the commons of 
human nature in its enclosure in network capital's rush to appropriation, the mass subject of 
the network is in process of releasing itself from nostalgia for a lost, and never satisfactory, 
Self; instead, as Toussaint L'Ouverture rejected Africa in favour of re-appropriating the logic of 
Enlightenment for the Haitian revolution, so we must seize the condition of massification that 
is our inheritance as the basis for a new sociality beyond the gross expropriation. The 
difference between this proposal and oceanic oneness with the world of both primal fantasy 
and neoliberalism's market model is the proliferation of inauthentic pseudo-selves, a tactic of 
proliferating subjunctive actions and statements whose very inauthenticity undercuts the 
possibility of there being, within the regime of commodification, self-identical particulate 
behaviours. Already 'farming ' (click farms, goldfarmers) upset the ethos of the network. At 
least as a preliminary method for realising the lost potential dimension, and therefore a 
future as it fails to exist in either the semiotic square cartography or the insistent actuality of 
real-time enclosures, it has the virtue of discomfort. That discomfort arises in particular from 
the discursive construction of an 'I' as unit of reward. The fact that this 'I' has not yet earned 
the right to say 'we' drives its profound unhappiness and therefore its demand for more, for 
better, and most radically of all for happiness. The challenge of the present moment is to 
create the conditions for a ‘we’ that embraces all that has been enclosed, the environment, 
dead labour and human nature, in a shared trajectory towards a 'we' that cracks the 
structures of property in all its senses. 
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